AUKWARD! - No subs for you!
Congress being Congress Again
Washington DC 6 Jan 2023
AUKUS Political Trouble Ahead (as anticipated)
A year ago, almost to the day, ThirdOffset marveled at the announcement of an extraordinary new strategic treaty between Australia, the UK and US - AUKUS.1 The treaty shares a wide range of advanced classified technologies between the parties, including those involved in a nuclear submarine program.
At the time, ThirdOffset noted that while Australia would understandably prefer to keep billions of dollars at home by building the subs locally, it would likely transpire that its best course of action would be to buy off the shelf SSNs (including leasing boats prior to the arrival of new-builds). ThirdOffset’s preference was for the latest Virginia class.
ThirdOffset explored various industrial and political issues and asked whether America could accommodate additional orders.
VIRGINIA’s are coming off the line at 2 per year. There is reported capacity to add a third. Would America ceed its needs and program objectives to keep Australia happy?
The answer from Congressional leaders this week is - - - - NO!
In a report released yesterday on Breaking Defense, the bipartisan leaders of the Senate Armed Services wrote a letter to President Biden raising questions whether America could really accommodate the terms of the treaty.
“Over the past year, we have grown more concerned about the state of the U.S. submarine industrial base as well as its ability to support the desired AUKUS SSN [nuclear sub] end state,” Sens. Jack Reed, D-R.I., and James Inhofe, R-Okla., wrote in a Dec. 21 letter sent to the White House. “We believe current conditions require a sober assessment of the facts to avoid stressing the U.S. submarine industrial base to the breaking point.”
The Australians are currently a year into an 18 month evaluation program to decide how to best take advantage of the treaty. The timing of this letter and its stated development of new concerns, suggests it might be related to the engagement they have received from Canberra. Reports from Australia over the past year seem to indicate a preference for leasing and later purchasing Virginia class boats. Many of the senior advisers to the Australian government and industry on the program are retired US Navy, not Royal Navy, Admirals.
Building the worlds most advanced attack and ballistic missile nuclear submarines is a significant industrial achievement, even for a superpower. US SSN and SSBN production lines have been stretched for years just meeting domestic requirements.2 Projections for adding 1 SSN per year were at the most optimistic end of the spectrum. Given shortfalls and delays, any added capacity would likely be prioritized to help bridge gaps in US requirements before allied needs are considered.
This new position coming from Congress signals that if there was any pre-AUKUS liaison between the Administration and Congress over the feasibility of selling SSNs to Australia, it has been reconsidered, and not in Australia’s favor.
So what?
Understandably, the Australians expressed a preference to build the new submarines at home with the massive economic, industrial, technological and knowledge stimulus that would accompany such a momentous program. While plausible, that is not a realistic option. This is not just a nuclear industrial capacity or proliferation issue.3 Today, Australia does not have the capability, workforce or industrial base capable of servicing a visiting Virginia class submarine. With no prior submarine manufacturing capability prior to 1990, building the 6 conventional Collins class submarines currently in the RAN stretched Australia to the limit. Building 8-12 Virginia class nuclear boats is orders of magnitude more complicated. This is not to say Australia could not meet the challenge. It is to ask why it should bother trying, given the preponderance of prima facie evidence that there are easier ways forward than manufacturing nuclear attack submarines. Additionally, the inevitable cost and time blowouts associated with any program, and particularly applicable to a huge complex untried brand new program, would leave Australia with no submarines at a time in its history when they are needed most.
SASC is forgetting something important
The United States needs Australia. Advances in Chinese military technologies coupled with new agreements with small island states in the second and third island chains, leaves Australia as the last outpost with sufficient strategic depth from which to conduct operations around the first island chain.
In recognition of this strategic reality, the US Army, Air, and Space forces are all investing heavily in Australia, enhancing extant facilities to be able to accommodate more troops, platforms, logistic and intelligence support needs. US Marines, nuclear capable B-52 squadrons and advanced fighter aircraft are already all in constant rotation through Australia.
The US Navy desperately needs survivable submarine service and maintenance facilities in the region. Currently Guam is the only SSN maintenance facility in the SW Pacific. Even with its coming missile defense upgrades, every single item of military significance on that island is already zeroed in on PLA missile guidance systems. The first thousand shots of any war will be to deny Guam (Okinawa and other close-in bases) from US forces.
That is an unacceptable strategic risk that must be addressed as a matter of urgency. Australia is the only practical answer for geographical, political, industrial, logistical, intelligence-sharing, systems interoperability, and strategic reasons.
New Virginia boats operated under an Australia flag from bases deep in the South Pacific is better than US flagged boats operating from Hawaii. In reality, for many years to come, the SSNs leaving Australian waters would be mostly American manned but the Australians would be picking up the bulk of the costs of manufacturing new submarines coming off the production line as they learn the complex new systems we have already decided to share with them. In exchange, America would be investing in new submarine bases that it would need to build somewhere in the region anyway as a back up to Guam. No other location offers the advantages that Australia does to USN submarine operations.
Congress needs to stop thinking about these programs as some kind of international social welfare program that leaves America last. AUKUS puts America first by shoring up its last remaining strategic bastion surrounded by tumultuous seas.
Full disclosure, Thirdoffset is a former Australian defense official, turned American defense official.
Thirdoffset expects that the new Columbia Class will not be produced in time to make patrol requirements as mandated by law.
Australia does not use nuclear power nor does it have an industrial base with any experience in nuclear technology with the exception of one very small scientific research reactor. In order to avoid proliferation issues, it has been suggested that self-contained reactors and fuel modules could be made in the US and plugged into Australian built hulls. Thirdoffset does not know how feasible that is, but even assuming it is possible, it does not alter the other challenges noted.