Force Design 2030
A quick note on Lessons from Ukraine
Washington DC Originally published in May 2022 on LinkedIn
The war in Ukraine offers evidence to support both sides of the USMC debate.
Hit and run light infantry armed with MANPADs, supported by intel from various sources - including remote sensors sending data to cue non emitting shooters - have torn the Russians apart. Ukraine constantly needs more supplies of these systems because they are so effective. The sinking of the Moskva is a stunning example of innovative littoral operations in a contested environment (where it was reported that a remote US P-8 worked with Ukrainian drones and shore based missile systems to distract, target and attack the Russian flagship achieving complete surprise).
Ukraine is also urgently seeking and receiving heavy combined arms capabilities - artillery and armor. These are needed to go on the offensive to push the Russians back. Light forces work for defense as the Russians probe, but if you are counter attacking their massed armor center you need protection - esp if you do not have air dominance.
How can both sides be right? Because the devil is in the details. A proper analysis has to take an incredible amount of data into consideration. For a few examples, geography is important. The correlation of forces matters. The comparative strengths and weaknesses of both sides (military, economic, diplomatic, political) and their support systems matters. Slogans in 700 word opinion pieces have their place but they do not substitute for a full analysis.
The geography of the pacific rim is not like the heartland of central Europe. Heavy weapons have uses in certain contexts - on the bigger islands and mainland Asia. So do the critics contend the US will invade mainland Asia? They don't say so explicitly. They need to.
The critics say the USMC will be unable to engage in another Hue City - meaning a major city in a hostile country with little support for US activities a long way from major US staging bases. Why would we want to? What operational or strategic imperative will be achieved? Are we talking taking Shanghai? Taiwan? In what context? Without first gaining island bases? They dont address this. They need to.
Chinese forces are not the same as Russia's (how much they are different beyond basic capabilities is critical - for example has the PLA really cleaned up its corruption which has so heavily impacted Russian performance?) Their key advantage is 2000+ long range missiles enveloping the SCS. How will the US military peel back the A2AD layers to get a foothold and should the Marines play a role in that? They do not touch this at all. They need to.
Should the US fill Asia with its own long range missile forces to put its own A2AD screen down to restrict China? Neither side of the USMC debate is addressing this because it is complicated.
The critics raise some good points but we need much more data and analysis. Contrarianism is easy. Building a robust alternative fully addressing all key contextual issues is hard.