Could Siberia be a Greater Prize than the South China Sea for China?
Ukraine war - Unintended 3rd order consequences
Washington DC 16 May 2022
Russia's spectacular failure in Ukraine has transformed China’s strategic options, for the better. Whereas Xi appeared ready to tandem-invade Taiwan just as soon as the olympics and party congress were out of the way, opening a second front in a new global war that Washington would have struggled to resist, Xi now has some important lessons from which to draw in reassessing his next moves. Why grasp at a porcupine when a big fat much despised sloth has fallen asleep on your doorstep? Unlike Taiwan, Siberia is not protected by a moat, is no longer protected by a major military force, is not likely to gain much international sympathy if attacked (smart balancers might even encourage/support such a move, or at a minimum look away), is vastly superior to Taiwan in terms of resources, is population scarce, already infiltrated by significant numbers of loyal Han Chinese, and the PRC arguably has as much claim to sovereignty over Siberia as it does over the South China Sea. Compared to Taiwan, Siberia is fecund, plump, low hanging strategic fruit.
Antebellum, the Sino-Russian strategic plan was to conduct tandem Ukraine/Taiwan invasions to present Washington with a global war on two fronts while it was struggling against a Russian sponsored slow-moving coup at home. It is notable that the CNO said only this past week that the USN is incapable of fighting two regional wars simultaneously. The ‘friendship without limits’ agreement was almost certainly the public face of a private agreement to coordinate war plans. Putin and Xi predictably came to the conclusion that the culmination of the forever wars in the Kabul debacle was the final straw that broke America’s global leadership back. To test this assumption, Xi sent daily waves of combat aircraft against Taiwan, triggering debilitating false alarms, while Putin massed his ‘modernized’ military on Ukraine’s borders. Neither micro-aggression saw any substantive response from America beyond empty talk about red lines.
The stage was set for macro-aggression. However, timing coordination was difficult. Moscow wanted it all over for the May 9 parade, while Beijing needed Putin to delay until the Olympics where over. Xi also decided to wait for the party congress to lock-down his Maoesque ‘leader-for-life’ gambit before his impatience for a quick and glorious war was unleashed. That delay likely saved his neck and has granted him a new and exciting opportunity: Siberia.
In retrospect, "friendship without limits" was canny on Putin's part. It hemmed in Xi, not just on the world stage but also against making any move on Russia’s exposed eastern flank. For his part, Xi must feel played by Putin. Grandiose promises of fealty no longer appear so wise now that Russia is the scourge of the world. China must now navigate offering Russia something to honor their agreement, while avoiding global condemnation for association with the ultimate contemporary war criminal. So much for non-interference in the internal affairs of other states!
Worse, Xi’s judgement is coming into question at precisely the wrong time for him politically. Despite the fact that term limits on Xi’s position were removed in anticipation of the party congress later this year, he is not without critics. A debate is taking place in Beijing over whether appointing Xi president for life is wise. Critics are concerned about all the unwanted attention he has garnered by prematurely exchanging ‘hide your strength and bide you time’ with counterproductive ‘wolf warrior’ hypernationalism. As China’s economy slides, his wisdom as a great leader is looking increasingly vulnerable. The limitless friendship with the world’s greatest loser is just icing on the cake.
It does not help Xi’s case that some party officials have started to speak out. Hu Wei, vice-chairman of the Orwellian-named ‘Public Policy Research Center of the Counselor’s Office of the State Council’, issued a prescient warning to Chinese policy makers in mid-march:
Unless Putin can secure victory with China’s backing, a prospect which looks bleak at the moment, China does not have the clout to back Russia. China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut off as soon as possible.
Midbellum, the only friendship without limits is between Ukraine and the rest of the world. President Zelenskyy's extraordinary leadership, the mastery of his military, and will of his people, have empowered the world to support Ukraine in ways no one expected. The unanticipated 2nd and 3rd order consequences of the progress of this war for all actors are only just starting to come to the surface.
Putin’s catastrophic failure should cause a major rethink in Beijing across the portfolio of China’s national interests, including, but not limited to, support of Putin, assumptions regarding the military and political ease of taking Taiwan, designs on domination of the South China Sea, and the sudden gasping military/political power vacuum in their resource dense, but population sparse, immediate north.
A wise leader would see that Putin's failure opens a new door to Siberia for Xi to save face. In 2015 Frank Jacobs pondered this possibility. Circumstances have radically shifted since - in China's favor. Jacob's addressed how the border had been seriously diluted by trade, migration, and asymmetric demographic pressures (Russia down/PRC up).
"The 1.35 billion Chinese people south of the border outnumber Russia's 144 million almost 10 to 1. The discrepancy is even starker for Siberia on its own, home to barely 38 million people, and especially the border area, where only 6 million Russians face over 90 million Chinese. With intermarriage, trade and investment across that border, Siberians have realized that, for better or for worse, Beijing is a lot closer than Moscow.
The land is already providing China, “the factory of the world,” with much of its raw materials, especially oil, gas and timber. Increasingly, Chinese-owned factories in Siberia churn out finished goods, as if the region already were a part of the Middle Kingdom's economy.
Since the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has doubled down on his sunk costs by shifting his forces in the east to reinforce efforts in Ukraine. The new agreement with Xi changed Putin’s risk calculus, giving him time and space against his extant vulnerabilities in the east. However, these continue to magnify with each tank that leaves on a trans-Siberian train. At some point Putin’s sunk costs become Xi’s irresistible temptation. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact had its limitations/uses as well.
Very interesting, thank you for this information 👍
Now, more than a year later, one might say that Russia is achieving its goal in Ukraine... even without showing its real military might.